Anthropology in its modern understanding was invented by Kant in his pre-critical period. However, Kant’s Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view was published at the very end of his life. Michel Foucault showed the possibility of interpreting this work as a synthesis of transcendentalism and empiricism, which distorts the universal principles of transcendental reason or law. It is precisely such a distortion of the universal human in reality, according to Kant, that allows passion, happiness, and freedom to exist. This separation of the empirical and transcendental in man led to its doubling and the emergence of the subject I along with the object I, which Kant considered analogs. This is the origin of the European tradition introducing the Other into the composition of man, in which the Self is reflected as in the alter ego. This doubling introduces distance into a human being, which is constantly increasing in the future. Kant’s anthropology turns into ethnography where instead of the mirror alter ego (the Other), the Foreigner appears who is a representative of other cultures. The appearance of the Foreigner figure seems to allow one to go beyond the borders of doubling and analogs. It leads to what Merleau-Ponty referred to as “secondary universalism”. Doubling relations gives way to relations of difference, otherness, implying an even greater increase in the distance in regard to the Foreigner, which forms the idea of European identity. Clifford Geertz saw this slide into otherness in the translation of discourse (oral) into text (written), and Paul Rabinow suggested searching for a solution to this slide in anthropological polyphony. The development of foreignness and otherness was accompanied by the idea of distancing foreign culture over time. However, all these approaches and ideas became possible only within the framework of globalization of consciousness and the establishment of common time and space principles. The paradox of anthropological distancing, which has affected the majority of local and non-European cultures, turns out to be a product of expanding the field of connections and relationships that constitute the new complexity of fragmented universality.

A certain «resumption» of «Heidegger’s work» related to the publication of his speeches, reports, and public statements made in 1933–1934 not only eliminates a number of questions regarding the political and ideological position (here, alas, there is no room for doubt), but also requires a revision of the conceptional components of his philosophy. Moreover, such a movement is primarily dictated by the content of these texts, which allows us to conclude that Heidegger’s completely «sincere» fascination with the ideas of national socialism overall, and the figure of Hitler in particular, leads Heidegger himself to a very distinct explication of his own philosophical position. The dramatic nature of the situation lies in the fact that this kind of explication concerns the key concepts of fundamental ontology: being, existence, nature, and truth. An analysis of the published texts shows the presence of direct racial connotations in references to nature, the identification of existence and being with people and the state, respectively. Heidegger’s concepts of «interceding domination», «unconcealment», and knowledge take on a definite connotation. This is not simply about justifying labor camps and arguments about the health of people or the «harsh tribe» already causing a specific reaction, but also about the concrete implementation of the Third Reich’s policy during the rector period, and, perhaps worst of all, about attempts to introduce the foundations of Nazism and Hitlerism into philosophy. In other words, the question of the very possibility of drawing the line between philosophy and «personal» political preferences in connection with Heidegger’s legacy is now more acute than ever.

The figure of Heidegger, through which the philosophical paradigms of the XX century are largely comprehended, does not allow for ignoring the question about the vital and ingrained connection between philosophy and politics. The question here unfolds both in the perspective of mutual influence and requirements applied to the philosophical position in its reflection of power, history, race, people, and in the perspective of fate and the possibility of philosophy. The «Heidegger case» allows us to raise the question of the word in public space, the possibilities of understanding and translating philosophical concepts into the language of an «unprepared» listener, as well as about the listener himself. German workers of that time were capable of hearing Heidegger’s speech and were inspired by it. Jaspers, on the contrary, paying tribute to the power of Heidegger’s thought, initially believed that it was precisely for this reason that insufficiently prepared students should not be granted access to it. The question of who is capable, ready, and can make out the meaning of philosophical speech problematizes the universality of philosophy, arouses suspicion and reproaches of elitism, and threatens to profanate philosophical thought. The publication of Martin Heidegger’s Black Notebooks makes it possible to require a certain shift in emphasis when attempting to answer these questions. The tone here is set by the fact that the publication of Heidegger’s legacy was thought out by him himself and, without a doubt, it was a calculated gesture. In this case, we can pose the question to what extent this gesture is related to the response to the postmodern thesis about the author’s death, because it is precisely the fact that these works have been published which requires a rethinking of the entire corpus of Heidegger’s texts. Following this, the question about philosophy’s fate becomes inevitable: does not the project of Western European metaphysic’s deconstruction stem from the project of philosophy’s deconstruction itself? Finally, philosophy as such has its own logic, order of movement, and possibilities of resistance. In our attempts to abandon philosophy, and replace it with metapolitics, do we not fall into the trap of philosophy itself, which does not allow us to turn away from the philosophy of the subject, leaving Heidegger alone with his own thoughts? In this manner, philosophy not only consoles, but triumphs. Precisely this aspect is discussed in the conversation between Vladimir Mironov and Valery Anashvili.

The publication of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks revealed a number of problems in the thinker’s legacy. These problems not only call into question the textual reliability of continuing the publication of collected works and the degree of Heidegger’s commitment (and involvement) to the ideology of Third Reich, but also make it possible to search and trace the connection between the mentioned ideology and the philosophical project, declared mainly in Being and Time. Of course, “Heidegger’s casus” gave rise to a series of attempts to “justify,” “soften,” and “retouch” such a shameful connection and it requires open criticism, immediate exposure, and an uncompromising rejection. In the published material, the study of Heidegger’s antisemitism, based on various statements by the thinker, is closely intertwined with criticism of contemporary attempts (Trawny) to smooth things over and remove the acuteness of the issue. Since the awkward attempts to whitewash Heidegger and present him in a more favorable light than he deserves goes much further than inadequate translations and suppression, often hinting at the homonymy of his terminology and the rhetoric of national socialism, it is important to provide a response to these mind tricks. The praise that Heidegger showers on Hitler and Mussolini can be traced back to Heidegger’s concept of historicity, revealing his ideological and political foundation as well as showing the risks of such conceptual work.

The problem of modes of visibility in political space is a relevant and developing area of research in modern political theory, which, on the one hand, ethically and epistemologically conceptualizes modes of vision, and on the other hand, studies the dispositions of public spaces organized by these modes of vision.

This article is an attempt to outline the phenomenology of the (in)visible in the public sphere. Hannah Arendt’s concept of a common world is used as a starting point, in which the distinction between different significant others is a prerequisite for the establishment of the public sphere and the organization of the political space. It is shown how this basic ontological distinction (the presence of many different others) can be deformed through certain strategies of a commanding view, which are problematized in modern criticism of the ocular-centric paradigm, i. e., the paradigm according to which the view (the bearer of the view or one who has the right to a view) has a determining and dominant role in culture. These strategies are as follows: objectification (reduction to an object of existence) by means of a view; deliberate fusion of the boundaries between subjects, creating a zone of indistinguishability; removing subjects into a zone of negative visibility (giving what is visible a negative status). By referring to Bernhard Waldenfels’ responsive phenomenology, a type of rationality is reconstructed that – denying the presence of many different other – produces and destroys its other, remaining indifferent to it at the extreme. The article clarifies the conceptual and methodological foundations and key concepts of Russian and western studies, included in the thematic selection and problematizing various aspects of (in)visibility/(in)distinguishability in the public sphere.

Proceeding from the metaphorical meaning of the concept of invisibility (deliberate disregard), the author of the article pose the question of how the act of recognition can be epistemologically represented. As a starting point, it is hypothesized that the distinction between the two forms of invisibility – physical, literal, and metaphorical, intentional – indirectly designates what precisely should be added to the perception of an individual, to the awareness of his presence, in order for it to turn into an act of recognition. Consideration of the question of meaning of recognition is preceded by a detailed analysis of the difference between a literal and figurative meaning of “invisibility”. The history of culture knows numerous instances when those in power demonstrate their own social superiority, not noticing those whom they rule over. “Seeing through” the other has a performative element, since it requires a demeanor or gestures that indicate that the other is not seen by chance, but deliberately. “Perception” must mean more than its visual aspect suggests, namely identifying and observing someone or something. Visibility means more than perceptibility, since it implies the ability for rudimentary individual identification of the subject. Physical visibility entails rudimentary individual recognizability and, accordingly, represents the first basic level of what we refer to as “understanding.” The article makes an attempt to formulate a concept that is the positive opposite of “invisibility” in a figurative sense.

The right to look affirms independence – not individualism or voyeurism, but a claim to political subjectivity and collectivity. It implies an exchange rather than profit. This means recognizing the other in order to obtain a starting point from which it is possible to make claims about rights and determine what is specifically correct. It is precisely the claim to subjectivity that has the freedom to establish relationships between the visible and the spoken. The opposite of the right to look is not censorship, but rather visuality as the power that dictates what you can or cannot look at. The term “visuality” dates back to the early XIX century, when it meant the visualization of history. The ability to gather material for visualization is a testament to the power of the visualizer. In turn, mastery of power requires constant renewal in order to gain recognition as something “normal” and everyday since it is always deliberately challenged. Thus, independence affirmed by the right to look opposes the authority of visuality. The article analyzes and identifies three primary complexes of visuality and countervisuality: the plantation complex that supported the transatlantic slave trade; what some apologists for the British Empire perceived as the imperial complex; what President Dwight Eisenhower denoted as the military-industrial complex, which continues today in many ways. A complex, in this case, means the formation of a number of social organizations and processes, as well as the state of an individual’s psychic system. Each complex has scope and stability, forming a distinct world that can be both an object of visualization and an environment.

At the beginning of the 20th century, “transparency” became a key concept in Mexican politics. Many viewed it as the highest ideal, while political life followed a pessimistic and violent scenario. It is generally accepted that transparency was at the core of the democratic process, which began after the same party was in power for seventy-one years, and it was accompanied by a reorganization of the state and society according to the neoliberal model. Today, the direct link between transparency and democracy is impeded by the appearance of the socalled “surveillance society” in which the state and private corporations can invade the most private areas of private and public life. Transparency in such a context can lead to a rapid devaluation of the rights to personal secrecy, alienation, and otherness, which is facilitated by the seemingly voluntary inclusion of people into the world of digital technology. This article examines one of the most notable incarnations of the ideal of transparency in the urban environment of modern Mexico – the Stele of Light in Mexico City. Studying the brief cultural history of this phenomenon, as well as the controversy around it between artists and activists, makes it possible to not only reveal the context of mistrust that awakened an unbridled desire for greater political openness, but also the degree to which activists and civic organizations began to seek openness from the out of-control state. Public art is becoming an important platform for interaction and expressing competing opinion about what may be hidden behind “immediate” political truths.

The article deals with the problem of limits of visibility of the «alien» in the phenomenological and sociological description. Analizing Bernhard Waldenfels’ and Georg Simmel’s project, the author sets up a problem of the nature of relations between the sense of the strangeness of the city and the alienation of people within the city. Can one type of perception overlap another or somehow intersect with it? Does the sense of the strangeness of the city precede people’s alienation in megalopolis? Solving this problem requires clarifying of observer’s position and conceptualization of the space. The main thesis suggested here is the phenomenological and sociological model of analysis ultimately excludes each other, because they refer to different perspectives – either in first or in third person point of view. As a phenomenologist we are talking about the atopic character of the experience. In contrast, sociological model of analysis implies an objectified and measurable distance between people. Thus, the question of interrelations between the strangeness of a city and the alienation of people has two logical solutions. But only one of them is productive. The author demonstrates the possibilities of the phenomenological definition of alien, referring to study of the urban atmospheres. The paper’s conclusion is that a sense of the strangeness of a city precedes the distinction between the atmospheres within a city: it eliminates the possibility of understanding city life, as well as the possibility of establishing social relations.

The public sphere as understood by Hannah Arendt is a place of the “common world,” a space of human association. It is the place where we can escape from the loneliness of our private, “elusive,” finite existences in order to associate with something greater. Politically, in the public sphere we can talk about public concerns and be certain that we will be heard. However, in practice, as theorists of the public sphere demonstrate, the possibility of meeting and communication for different groups in a common communicative field often does not arise. Thus, a person marked with a disability status in Russia resides almost exclusively in a private world, like an invisible person. The inclusion of people with disabilities into the “common world” is hindered by both the specifics of the public sphere in the post-Soviet reality, where the “private prevailed over the public” (B. Gladarev), and the problems of physical, sensory, access to public spaces as well as the specific representations of people with disabilities in mass media. Examples of successful communication platforms are various websites and mailing lists where blind people themselves present and discuss issues they consider important: how a blind client can sign documents, how audio descriptions work in movie theaters, and which telephone to choose or how to make a certain application work on it. The “common world” as a place of mutual representation, communication, and political action also appears on the platforms created by intersectional associations of women with various types of disabilities.

The article provides a detailed overview of the work of one of the key intellectual journals in France “Esprit” (founded in 1932). In the dialogue between a sociologist with editorial experience and the editor-in-chief of the French journal with 20 years of experience, the principles of operation and financing the publication, structure of the editorial office and communication with readers, the practice of searching for authors and mechanisms of coaptation of the editorial group, selection criteria and revision of articles, alliances and tensions in the publishing field, and the relationship of an intellectual journal with a political agenda are revealed. The self-reflective analysis describes the conditions necessary to maintain a public intellectual project on the border between academic disciplines and journalism. Specific attention is paid to the issues of gathering editors’ and authors’ competencies, updating intellectual preferences and intergenerational cooperation, and the possibility of taking into account readers’ expectations.