Invisibility: On the Epistemology of Recognition

Abstract

Proceeding from the metaphorical meaning of the concept of invisibility (deliberate disregard), the author of the article pose the question of how the act of recognition can be epistemologically represented. As a starting point, it is hypothesized that the distinction between the two forms of invisibility – physical, literal, and metaphorical, intentional – indirectly designates what precisely should be added to the perception of an individual, to the awareness of his presence, in order for it to turn into an act of recognition. Consideration of the question of meaning of recognition is preceded by a detailed analysis of the difference between a literal and figurative meaning of “invisibility”. The history of culture knows numerous instances when those in power demonstrate their own social superiority, not noticing those whom they rule over. “Seeing through” the other has a performative element, since it requires a demeanor or gestures that indicate that the other is not seen by chance, but deliberately. “Perception” must mean more than its visual aspect suggests, namely identifying and observing someone or something. Visibility means more than perceptibility, since it implies the ability for rudimentary individual identification of the subject. Physical visibility entails rudimentary individual recognizability and, accordingly, represents the first basic level of what we refer to as “understanding.” The article makes an attempt to formulate a concept that is the positive opposite of “invisibility” in a figurative sense.